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Further Evidence on Wage and Productivity 






  This paper discusses the relationship between the elasticities of wages and 
productivity with respect to human capital. The goal is to search if there is a distortion 
on the expected relationship between these two variables, given market forces and a 
selfish behavior by agents, as it is found in some Europeans countries. A general 
equilibrium, overlapping generation model that can capture the relationship between 
these two elasticities is presented. Two equations that emerge from this model are 
estimated, using data from RAIS and IBGE Pesquisa Industrial Annual for 2000. The 
results indicate that local labor market attenuates income inequality, transferring income 
from more qualified to less qualified workers, similarly to what happens in European 




  Esse trabalho discute a relação entre as elasticidades dos salários e da 
produtividade com respeito ao capital humano dos indivíduos. O seu objetivo é 
investigar se no Brasil, assim como tem sido apontado em alguns países europeus, há 
distorções a partir de valores sociais que mudam a relação que essas duas elasticidades 
deveriam ter, se determinadas apenas a partir da racionalidade egoísta dos agentes e as 
forças de mercado. Um modelo de equilíbrio geral com gerações justapostas é 
desenvolvido para explicar a relação entre essas duas elasticidades. Dados da RAIS e da 
Pesquisa Industrial Anual do IBGE são utilizados para estimar duas equações desse 
modelo. Os resultados indicam que há transferência de renda dos indivíduos mais 
qualificados para os menos qualificados, semelhante a que ocorre nos países europeus. 
Ou seja, apesar do Brasil ter uma alta concentração de renda, o mercado de trabalho 
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1. Introduction 
 
Brazil is a country with high personal income inequality. Its Gini Coefficient is 
one of the highest in the world, according to World Bank and United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) statistics, which are regularly published in their yearly 
publications.
1 This coefficient in Brazil varies for different years and methods of 
calculation, but it is normally over 0.60, which is considered high for world standards. 
 
There are many causes for this income inequality pointed in the literature. They 
vary from simple arguments, such as racial attributes and regional inequalities to the 
most commonly pointed problems, which are the disparities in educational attainment. 
There is this general idea that education is a major determinant of income inequality in 
Brazil. Obviously, some studies search for causes of educational inequality relying on 




Others point to the high return the local labour market pays to education, as a 
mechanism to generate the existing high inequality.
3 A study by Psacharopoulos (1994) 
indicates that the return to education in Brazil is one of the highest in the world. More 
recent studies on Brazilian labour market have confirmed that such returns are still 
high.
4 This problem becomes particularly relevant because Barros and Mendonça 
(1996) have pointed that educational attainment is by far the most important factor 
determining income inequality, when a decomposition of its variance is made. 
 
Its has been argued in the literature that sometimes the labour market can distort 
productivity differences generated by differences on educational attainment.
5 Under 
such argument, it is possible an extra year of education on average increases a worker’s 
productivity by x%, while his wage increases by (x+y)%, where y≠ 0. If y>0, this labour 
market transfer income from poorer workers to richer workers. On the other way 
around, if y<0 this labour market transfer income from richer workers to the poorer 
ones. 
 
Most of the arguments justifying such distortions generated by labour markets 
rely on social values to justify them. A society may have social values in favour of 
equality, which justify transference from rich workers to poorer ones. In the same way, 
the social values may promote income inequality through transferences from poorer 
workers to rich ones. 
 
Despite the frequent blame of high returns to education as a major source of 
income inequality in Brazil, the possibility of existing distortion of such returns by 
social values were never verified. All studies that emphasize this problem always take 
for granted that markets pay relative wages that reflect productivity differentials, 
although the possibility of distortions are mentioned in the world literature.
6 
                                                 
1 In World Bank (2002) and UNDP (2002), Brazil states the fourth highest Gini. 
2 See for example Ferreira (2000) for this approach. 
3 See Barros, Henriques and Mendonça (2000). 
4 See for example Barros (2001) and Ueda and Hoffmann (2002). 
5 See for example Katz and Autor (1999). 
6 See for example Krueger and Lindahal (1999) for such hypothesis on the Swedish labour market.   3
Trying to contribute to fill up a lack in the literature on Brazilian labour market, 
this paper focus on this possibility of distortions of productivity differentials on wages 
inequalities. The paper is organized as follows. Next section analyze some world data to 
support the hypothesis that return to education is a relevant variable determining income 
concentration. Section 3 introduces a simple general equilibrium model that can capture 
the two alternative hypotheses that are object of test and gives a formal support for most 
of the hypotheses raised to justify differences in return to education found in the 
literature. Section 4 discusses the method to test the two alternative hypotheses and 
brings the results of the empirical tests. Section 5 analyzes the potential distortion on the 
results that may arise from limitations on the dataset used on estimations and section 6 
summarizes the major conclusions reached throughout the paper. 
2.   Inequality and return to education 
  
The relationship between income inequality and the return to education is quite 
obvious. As long as a non-null share of income of most individuals accrues to them as a 
consequence of their working activities, the higher this return to education, the higher 
will be income inequality among these individuals, as the inequality on this particular 
share of income will increase. 
 
Of course this relationship may be theoretically reversed if there is a negative 
correlation between other incomes and educational attainments. If individuals with low 
education tend to have a relatively higher income that do not accrues to him/her from 
work, higher returns to education could actually be distributive, if the share of income 
accruing from work is relatively lower. Nevertheless, this does not seem to be the case 
in most countries, although some rational support to that could be found under some 
circumstances. 
 
As the direct relationship between income inequality and return to education is 
not necessarily true, although most researchers assume it exists, this section provide a 
simple test of this hypotheses, relying on a cross section dataset of countries. More 
precisely, the Gini coefficient was regressed against the return to education and a 
constant. Data for Gini coefficient came from World Development Report (2000) and 
data for Returns of Education from Pscharopoulos (1994). Both sources of data present 
statistics that are not for the same year for all countries and some of them are for early 
years in the eighties. Nevertheless, previous studies on these two indexes show that they 
are quite sluggish on their time evolution. Therefore, previous returns to education 
consist in a good instrument to more recent returns. Estimations were made by Ordinary 
Least Squares with correction for heteroskedasticity by the method of White (1980). 
Table 1 brings the results of this estimation. A more reasonable fit was obtained with a 
squared function, so that return appears also squared in this table. For the interval of 
returns to education found in the dataset, an increase in this return also increases the 
Gini index. Nevertheless, the empirically found relationship is not so strong, as the 
squared coefficient of determination (R
2) is quite small. In spite of this low R
2, these 
results support the idea that return to education is a relevant determinant of income 
distribution and this relationship that underline some of the conclusions of this paper 
have empirical support. 
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Table 1 
Results of Regression for Gini Index 
Variable  Coefficient Stand Error T-Statistics Significance 
Constant  28.2661 6.4530 4.3803  0.0000
Return of Education  1.8777 1.0003 1.8772  0.0605
Return of Education Squared  -0.0527 0.0309 -1.7070  0.0878
R2  0.1387 -  -  - 
Note: 52 countries were included in this regression. 
 
3.  Relative productivity and return to education 
 
As said before, an important step in understanding Brazilian income inequality is 
to explain its high rate of return to education. This step demands knowing what 
determines the rate of return to education. A simple overlapping generation model may 
unveil the major determinants of such variable. This model is the subject of this section. 
3.1. Families 
Suppose there are two types of families. Both are composed by two individuals, 
an adult and a child. Each person in both types of families lives two periods and is one 
child and one adult. As a consequence, there is no population growth. The parent is 
responsible for decisions of the family and he/she is the only one working. Therefore, if 
there are Lu and Ls families in each of these groups and each family supply one unit of 
labour, the maximum supply of labour in each of these groups will be Lu and Ls, 
respectively. 
 
Adults of families of type s face a Cobb-Douglas type utility function such as: 
 
  () 1 ln 1 ln ln ln ln + − − + + + = t t t t U C v U β α β α l   (1)
 
Where Ut+i is the utility function at time (t+i) for i=0 or i=1, Ct is the 
consumption of the only good produced in the economy, ℓt is leisure at time t and v is a 
constant, which is fixed, at least on the eyes of the utility maximizers. As already said, 
only the parent works and he/she does not get any utility in his/her own leisure, so that 
the leisure appearing in the utility function is the one of the child. By normalization, the 
working time of the parent Lt is set equal to one. The child spends his/her time either 
accumulating human capital or on leisure. His/her total time is also equal to one and the 
time accumulating human capital is (1-ℓt). In equation (1), α  and β  are parameters, such 
that 0<α <1, 0<β <1 and 0<(1-α -β )<1. Families attributing more value to leisure will 
have higher β . 
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Equation (1) may be solved recursively forward, yielding: 
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This family type s faces the following budget constraint: 
 
  i t i t W C + + =   (2)
 
Where Wt+i is the wage rate at time t+i. Differently from other overlapping 
generation models, such as the one presented by Galor and Zeira (1993), families do not 
save and they cannot borrow on the capital markets. If the arbitrage hypothesis 
embedded in Mincerian Equation is used, it is possible to define:
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Where W0 is wage for fully unskilled labour and R is the rate of return to 
education. Substitution of equation (3) in equation (2) yields: 
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If one takes natural logarithm of (2´) and substitutes it in equation (1´), a 
sufficiently large n may yield the following result: 
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The adult in this type of family maximizes this utility function. First order 







= − + l 1   (4)
 
For a given R, a family tends to set the same amount of time to human capital 
accumulation, so that an economy with many families of type s facing the same problem 
as this one will have a level of human capital constant over time. The higher is β , the 
more this type of family values leisure and the lower will be its human capital. In the 
same way, the more this family values consumption at the expense of leisure, the higher 
will be its human capital. Obviously, the higher is the rate of return to human capital, 
the higher will be the human capital of the family. 
 
                                                 
7 For a derivation of this arbitrage equilibrium, see Barros (2001).   6
In this economy, there are Ls families working according to this optimal 
behaviour. In addition to them, there are Lu families with no access to schooling. In fact 
it is known that this is not the case in Brazil or in most modern economies. 
Nevertheless, Brazilian population has access to different quality of schools, which 
determines different rates of human capital accumulation. Public schools, the ones 
accessible to most of the population, have very bad quality education, while private and 
expensive schools offer good quality education. Only the former are available to most of 
the population, mainly as consequence of the existence of credit constraints to finance 
the most expensive education.
8 This quality difference in schools is an instrument for 
one social class to keep social power and relative status, as argued by Ferreira (2000) 
and as such has a plausible logic to exist. For simplicity, in this model, it will be 
assumed that there are two social classes, one that have access to education and the 
other one with no access to any kind of education. It means that individuals in the 
poorer class use all their time as a child to leisure and all their grown up time to work in 
the second period of their life. Therefore, their supply of unskilled labour at each period 
is Lu. 
3.2. Firms 
There is no capital in this economy and there are two types of firms, one using 
only unskilled labour and the other one employing only skilled labour. As there is only 
one good in this economy, both firms produce the same type of good. Therefore, a 
representative firms would have the two lines of production and would face the 




t t t HL A L A Y 1 1 0 0 + =   (5)
 
Where Yt is the output of the only good produced, measured in units of this 
good, L0t is the unskilled labour employed and L1t is the amount of skilled labour 
employed. A0 and A1 are productivity indexes for plants employing unskilled and 
skilled labour, respectively. H is the level of skills per capita of the skilled labour, which 
is a function of the time spent on human capital accumulation. φ  and ρ  are fixed 
parameters, 0<φ <1 and 0<ρ <1. The proportion of firms in each of these groups was 
assumed to be one to one. For each firm employing unskilled labour, there is another 
one employing only skilled labour. This is only a simplifying assumption, which does 
not affect the results. 
 
The productivity coefficient A1 is not fixed, but actually is a function of the 










2 1   (6)
 
Where R
* is the ideologically expected return to human capital. Productivity 
deviates from a fixed parameter A2 as a consequence of differences between R from R
*. 
Effort of workers, such as well analyzed by Akerlof and Yellen (1990), justifies such 
changes in productivity. Nevertheless, δ  may be positive or negative in this model. If 
                                                 
8 Galor and Zeira (1993) forward a model in which credit constraint justifies differences in human capital 
accumulation, as the idea forwarded here.   7
δ >0, social ideology penalizes firms for excessive income wage disparities. Contrary, if 
δ <0, social ideology penalizes firms for excessive wage equality. If δ =0 productivity of 
firms are not affected by deviations of wages from the socially optimum. Therefore, this 
approach changes slightly the one proposed by Akerlof and Yellen (1990) as it moves 
focus to relative wages and considers productivity as a function of social evaluation of 
wage dispersion  in the firm, instead of a personal evaluation of ones own wage. 
 
As firms take A1 as fixed, and are able to set L0t and L1t to maximize profits, first 
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This is the demand of the representative firm for skilled labour. In the same way, 
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From this equation, it may be seen that the higher the amount of L0t+i, the lower 
will necessarily be the equilibrium wage for unskilled labour. In the same way, the 
higher is the productivity of this kind of labour A0, the higher will be the wage of 
unskilled labour.  
3.3. Equilibrium 
Equilibrium in the market for unskilled labour is quite simple. It demands only 
that demand and supply for unskilled labour are equal. This implies that L0t+i=Lu´, 
where Lu´ = (Lu/m1) and m1 is the number of firms employing unskilled labour. Under 
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The market for skilled labour is slightly more complicated. Nevertheless, 
equilibrium in this market also exist when L1t+i=Ls´, Ls´=(Ls/m2) and m2 is the number 
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This result leaves H and R still undetermined in this market. Although there is 
not a clear functional relationship between H and (1-ℓt+i), it is reasonable to assume that: 
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Where f´>0 and f(0)=0. Substituting this equation on equation (7´) gives a relationship 
between Wt+i and R arising from the demand for skilled labour. This equation may be 
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Substitution of equation (4) in equation (3) yields another relationship between 
these two variables, but emerging from the supply of labour in this case. This 
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An equilibrium market solution for R and Wt+i will emerge from this equation 
and equation (7”) together and the fixed value for Ls. Figure 1 draws these two 






To simplify, it was assumed that the second derivative of equation (7”) is 
negative, although this is not necessarily true, from the assumptions introduced hitherto. 
Moving the lines for each of these functions in figure 1 according to the impact of some 





























These results confirm through a formal model some well-settled conceptions on 
the determination of the return to education. They are: 
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i.  The higher the value on total utility given to leisure by educated families, the 
higher will be the return to education. 
ii.   The higher the value on total utility given to consumption by educated families, 
the lower will be the return to education, as agents will be more willing to work 
and make the effort to accumulate human capital. 
iii.  The higher the share of population with access to education, the lower will be the 
return to education. 
iv.  In the same way, the higher the share of population with no access to education, 
the higher will be the return to education. This certainly is an important source to 
explain the high rate of return to education in Brazil. 
v.  The high the value of education on social ideology, the higher will be the 
equilibrium rate of return to education. 
 
As the model advanced above does not include capital as a factor of production, 
any explanation for high rate of return to education emerging from capital market was 
ruled out from its conclusions. Nevertheless, as shown by Galor and Zeira (1993), using 
an overlapping generation model, the existence of credit constraints may also justify 
inequality and as a consequence it also determines the rate of return to education. 
Therefore, although this determinant was ruled out of the model by its simplifying 
assumptions, it does not mean that this factor should not be taken into account. It 
absence of the model is justified because it is not relevant for next steps of this paper. 
3.4. Productivity and wages 
Suppose there is a non-representative firm whose production function may be 
defined as: 
 
  ρ ρ
it it nt L H A y 2 =   (10)
 
Where ynt is its output and the other variables and coefficients are determined as 
before. The number of workers employed in this firm is m and each one supplies one 
unit of labour. This firm differs from the representative ones because it does not employ 
unskilled labour and its productivity does not depend on social values. Average 
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Combination of equations (7”) and (3´), which generates equilibrium between 
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Only if δ =0, the elasticity of wages with respect to human capital is ρ , the same 




























and wages in labour market dump productivity differences of such non-representative 
firm. It means that there is transference of potential income from more qualified 
workers to less qualified workers. Furthermore, the higher is the moral propensity to 
equality (the lower is R
*) the higher is this transference from workers with higher labour 
income to workers with lower labour income. 
 
In the other way around, if society is positive on paying a premium on education 
(δ <0), the inequality in equation (14) is reverted and the labour market transfers income 
from less qualified workers to more qualified workers. In this case the elasticity of 
productivity is higher than the one of wages, both with respect to human capital. Wages 
increase proportionally more when human capital increases than productivity does. This 
is the meaning of a labour market amplifying the role differences on education have on 
wages. 
 
All this developments indicates that the hypothesis that this paper aims to test is 
the sign of δ . If δ  is positive, the amplifying hypothesis is confirmed; otherwise, it is 
rejected. Next section tests these hypotheses using data from a non-representative firm. 
 
4. Empirical  test 
 
The empirical method to test hypotheses on the sign of δ  is quite simple. The 
















Where B is a constant, which is a function of R
*, ρ , α , β , A2 and Wu. In the same 
way, equation (11), with Lit=1, was used to obtain: 
 
  H A mt ln ln ln 2 ρ π + =   (16)
 
Both equations were estimated using cross sectional data for economic sectors in 
the Brazilian economy in the year 2000. Data for sectorial wages were obtained from 
RAIS (Relação Anual das Informações Sociais), a survey on labour conducted annually 
by the Brazilian Labour Ministry. This survey presents data for monthly average wages 
by sector, according to classification of IBGE, Brazilian National Statistics Institute. 
Data for average schooling for each sector are also provided by RAIS and were used as 
the measure of human capital. Data for productivity were calculated as output per hours 
worked in that sector. Output was measured in monetary units, as each sector includes 
several products. Both output and hours worked come from Pesquisa Industrial Annual   11
(PIA), the Brazilian annual survey of industry conducted by IBGE. All the data refers to 
the year 2000. 
 
Some sectorial dummies were introduced because either their average wages or 
productivities were excessively high. Normally this is associated to monopoly powers or 
abnormal union strength. The sectors in which these happened appear on tables 2 and 3, 
together with the results of estimations. All estimations were made by ordinary least 
square with correction for heteroskedasticity by the method of White (1980). 
 
Table 2 
Estimation Results for Wages Equation 
Variable  Coefficient  Stand Error  T-Statistics  Significance
Constant  8.4321 0.3694 22.8295  0.0000
Natural logarithm of Schooling  0.4392 0.1792 24.5058  0.0143
Dummy for oil and gas Extraction  1.8638 0.0958 19.4619  0.0000
Dummy for oil refining  1.3368 0.0514 26.0156  0.0000
Dummy for paper industry  0.8440 0.0470 17.9544  0.0000
Dummy for iron extraction  1.0468 0.1010 10.3658  0.0000
Dummy for army equipments and 
ammunitions.  1.1920 0.0544 21.9288  0.0000
R2  0.2756 -  -  - 
Note: 105 sectors were used in this estimation. 
 
Table 3 
Estimation Results for Productivity Equation 
Variable  Coefficient  Stand Error  T-Statistics  Significance 
Constant  9.5929 0.5233 18.3324  0.0000
Natural logarithm of Schooling  0.5231 0.2563 2.0408  0.0413
Dummy for oil and gas Extraction  2.7273 0.1332 20.4693  0.0000
Dummy for oil refining  3.2649 0.0773 42.2622  0.0000
Dummy for paper industry  2.1252 0.0688 30.8777  0.0000
Dummy for iron extraction  2.1683 0.1406 15.4235  0.0000
Dummy for army equipments and 
ammunitions.  1.9069 0.0819 23.2807  0.0000
R2  0.3781 -  -  - 
 














This only can be true if δ >0. Therefore, point estimations of these models 
indicate that the impact of human capital on productivity in Brazilian industry is higher 
than it is on wages in Brazil. This suggests that, despite the high return to education   12
found in Brazil, there is transference of income from more educated to less educated 
workers through labour market in this country. 
 
The two coefficients compared in equation (17) have normal distributions with 
expected value equal to the estimated parameters and standard deviations that appear on 
tables 2 and 3. Therefore, the hypothesis that they are equal may be carried through a 
statistics for mean comparisons. Particularly, the difference of the two coefficients, 
when divided by a function of their estimated standard deviations, under the null 
hypothesis that this difference is null, has a t-student distribution. The estimated 
statistics for this function is t=180.19 and it is distributed as a t-student with more than 
98 degrees of freedom.
9 A glance at the t-student distribution indicates that the null 
hypothesis that the two coefficients are equal is rejected at a p-value of 1%. 
 
Therefore, at a standard p-value found on the literature, the hypotheses δ =0, 
which is a consequence of the fact that the two coefficients are equal, is rejected. 
Results strongly support the idea that there is transference from more educated to less 
educated workers in the Brazilian labour market, similarly to what is suggested to 
European countries. This indicates that the high returns to education found in Brazilian 
labour market data is more a consequence of productivity differences than a 
consequence of concentrating transferences through labour market because of social 
values. Actually, social values work on the labour market to reduce productivity 
disparities, which are even wider than they appear on returns to education. 
5.  Limits of the dataset and comparisons with previous results 
 
  This research seeks to shed some light on a crucial concern on the Brazilian 
income distribution. It focuses on the possibility that Brazilian labour market generates 
some transference among individuals that may contribute to income concentration. The 
results obtained indicated that there are such transferences, but similar to what is found 
on European economies. More qualified workers transfer income to less qualified 
workers. In this sense, labour market attenuates income concentration. 
 
This result is radically different from what is found by Barros and Silva (2002), 
using another dataset. This other paper used data from a particular company, for 
workers who perform the same function, but that could have different productivities and 
educational attainments. As their output was exactly the same, their productivity could 
be measured in physical units, not in monetary units, as it was done here. Incentives to 
have the highest possible productivity justify the potential rise of differences on 
productivity among workers in their used dataset. Nevertheless, the performance of 
same activities tend to reduce the potential dispersion of productivity in this case, 
contrary to what is found here. 
                                                 
9 The estimated statistics t may be defined as: 
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Where the betas with hat are the estimated coefficients and S1 and S2 their respective estimated standard 
deviations. n1 and n2 are the size of the two samples.   13
Different workers may have their output affected by two factors. Firstly, they 
can have distinct labour intensity. One worker may impinge a faster speed to his/her 
work, which can be a consequence of either, his/her higher discipline or higher 
organizational ability. Secondly, they can also diverge on complexity of tasks, as more 
qualified workers can perform tasks to which the less qualified one does not have the 
necessary skills. These sources of differences on productivity tend to be a determinant 
of labour allocation. 
 
Given these potential sources of differences on productivity, it is possible to 
define labour productivity as a function of these three components, such as: 
 
  () C O D f , , = π   (18)
 
Where π  is labour productivity, D is a measure of discipline, O is a measure of 
organizational skills and C is a measure o complexity of tasks. All the three first 
derivatives of this function are positive. When two workers perform exactly the same 
tasks, as they do in the sample of Barros and Silva (2002), they only can diverge in D 
and O. They cannot diverge on C. Therefore the differences on productivity are 
restricted to some of its potential. This can explain their lower productivity than wage 
dispersion in the sample used. As the dataset used here allows for all the three 
differences, as tasks are different on each sector, differences on productivity were 
higher and actually overcome those on wages, implying that there are transference from 
more educated workers to less educated ones, as was seen in the previous sample. 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper discussed the possibility that Brazilian labour market may either 
magnifies existing productivity differences on relative wages or it may damp such 
differences as a consequence of social values. The model presented in section 2 shows 
that both alternatives are real possibilities, given some very simple economic, social and 
psychological behaviour of individuals.
10 If the first hypothesis is true, this market is 
increasing income concentration in hands of wealthier people and if the second 
hypothesis is true this market is attenuating such differences. In a country in which there 
is almost a political consensus that urge for improvements in its income distribution, 
this question is crucial. 
 
If labour market damps productivity differentials, the major policies to promote 
income distribution should focus mainly on improving the access to education for the 
whole population, specially the offspring of the poorer, as other studies show that 
someone who has lived in a poor household while young has higher probability to be 
poor too. More equality on educational access would be the path for better income 
distribution. Nevertheless, if transferences are in the other way around, policies to 
reduce such labour market bias could play a prominent role on distributive policies. 
Changes in ideologies should be the focus and policies such as minimum wages 
establishment could have a major role on improving income distribution. 
 
                                                 
10 Akerlof and Yellen (1990) discusses psychological and social foundations for the relationship between 
distributive values and effort, which is the underlining hypothesis supporting the economic results found 
in section 2.   14
A simple general equilibrium, overlapping generation model was presented in 
this paper so that the many sources to explain the determination of return to education in 
a society could be clearly identified. This model incorporated the idea that social values 
may have a relevant impact on the equilibrium return to education. In addition, it 
generated two structural equations that could be used to estimate the sign of the 
ideological bias. 
 
Results from estimation of a wage equation for Brazilian labour market using 
data from RAIS and a productivity equation also to Brazil, but using data from IBGE 
and RAIS indicate that labour market attenuates productivity differentials in Brazil, 
similarly to what is found for most European countries and contrary to what is 
suggested by some studies on the Brazilian labour market. Social values in Brazil are 
such that differences in productivity arising from differences in human capital are 
damped in relative wages. 
 
These results implies that the so much suggested need for improving educational 
access for the poor as a strategy to reduce income inequality in Brazil is once more 
supported by detection that the local labour market already does at least part of its share 
on dampening inequality. A safer and probable more efficient way to promote equality 
is tackling its true cause, which is deeply related to disparities in educational attainment. 
Nevertheless, given the relative high return to education in Brazil, it does not mean that 
some more dampening in productivity differences are not possible. 
 
The model developed in this paper emphasizes two important determinants of 
the relationship between the elasticities of productivity and wages with respect to 
education, which are not commonly pointed in the literature. If these two elasticities are 
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Therefore, this relationship, which has to be reduced in Brazil to diminish 
income disparities, depends only on R
* and δ , which are the socially fair return to 
education and the response of productivity to deviations of returns to education from 
this value, respectively. 
 
As most of the socially determined variables, the socially fair return to education 
also might be a function of previous social experiences. Obviously, many cultural 
aspects, such as cultural and even ethnical relations are crucial to determine the value of 
R
*. Nevertheless, the recent experiences, which are condensed on the previously 
observed values of the return to education, are important to determine R
*, as social 
values are strongly subject to hysteresis. Therefore, the higher the observed returns were 
in the past, the higher tend to be the relationship on equation (19) nowadays. 
 
The response of productivity to deviations of returns to education from the 
socially fair return, on its turn, also depends on social values. In this case, the relevant 
ones are those of solidarity among workers and social classes. The higher the solidarity 
among social classes and the many distinct intellectual social groups, the higher tends to 
be δ . When the relationship among social classes and groups is one of segregation, this   15
value is negative and this society tends to concentrate income. Estimations on this paper 
indicate that this is not the case in Brazil. In spite of having a very segregated society, 
Brazilian culture and ideology still are such that δ >0. 
 
Nevertheless, if the goal is to reduce income inequality, it is possible to try to 
reduce segregation and to further increase δ . An example of such policies could be to 
develop incentives to force poor and rich kids to go to the same schools. Such policies 
exist in some countries and normally are powerful to reduce income disparities. Brazil 
still faces tremendous class segregation in its educational system. This surely consists in 
a barrier to better income distribution, as δ  is not as high as it could. 
 
Changing ideology in a society is something very complicated. Sometimes it is 
necessary much effort to generate very small changes. Nevertheless, the struggle to 
improve income distribution in Brazil seems to require non-trivial ideological changes 
in social values. Re-structuring the educational system, not only improving the access it 
provides for all, but mainly improving the quality of public education, vis-à-vis private 
education, is a major step that can yield some of the necessary results. Studies on 
minimum wages, such as the one by Barros and Lemos (1997) and Camargo, Neri and 
Gonzaga (2001) indicate that a better management of the minimum wage policy also 
may yield some results. Nevertheless, further investigation on these subjects are 
necessary, including some sociological work, because when values are in question, 
sociologists have more to say than economists.   16
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